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SOLVING THE SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEM UNDER EQUALITY
CONSTRAINTS
JUAN A. CRESPO AND J. J. SA´NCHEZ-GABITES
Abstract. In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the
social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that
aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a social one. We analyze this problem
for sets of alternatives defined by equality constraints and obtain a solution that, in sharp
contrast to the classical ones, is expressed in an elementary language and ultimately reduces
the social choice problem to a standard constrained optimization problem.
By considering a toy example we shall be able to interpret this general result in terms
of the rationality (in the sense of Economics) of the design of the set of alternatives rather
than, surprisingly, that of the agents involved in the actual social choice problem.
Keywords. Social choice, optimal design.
JEL classification codes. D71, C60, D63.
1. Introduction
The social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a universal rule that
aggregates the individual preferences of several agents into a social one. More precisely,
suppose that an element needs to be selected out of a set of alternatives X on the basis of
the individual preferences of a number of agents, each of which may well want to choose a
different element from X . In order to make a collective (or social) decision it is necessary
to determine an ex-ante rule that, whatever the individual preferences of the agents, is able
to aggregate them into a social preference; the element that will finally be selected from X .
The aggregation rule is required to satisfy certain axioms which ensure that the aggregation
process is performed in a “socially acceptable” manner (for instance, it is usually required,
at least, that it considers all the agents equally). When no acceptable aggregation rule exists
it is customary to speak of a social choice paradox.
There are several social choice models in the literature. Since we shall consider sets of
alternatives determined by equality constraints, which generally consist of a continuum of
points, the most appropriate framework for our purposes seems to be the so-called topological
social choice model. We will describe it in some detail later on. This model has received
considerable attention since it was introduced in the past century, having been independently
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studied by authors such as Aumann [2], Eckmann [12], Hilton [14, 18], Chichilnisky and Heal
[8] or, more recently, Weinberger [30] (the interested reader may enjoy Eckmann’s historical
account [13]). Their solutions to the social choice problem may be roughly summarized in
the following result of Chichilnisky and Heal ([8, Theorem 1, p. 82]):
Theorem. Let the space of alternatives X be a parafinite CW complex. The social choice
problem over X has an affirmative answer if, and only if, each component of X is contractible.
This result, beautiful as it is, has several drawbacks which may have prevented it from
becoming more popular among theorists working in this and related areas:
• The language in which it is stated belongs to a rather specialized area of pure mathe-
matics (namely, geometric topology) and is very far from the elementary language of
the original social choice problem. In particular, there is no intuitive interpretation
of its meaning.
• It includes the technical condition that the space of alternatives should be a CW
complex, which even in the natural case that we consider in this paper (see below)
may not be satisfied at all.
• It does not provide a direct solution to the social choice problem but rather translates
it into another hard mathematical problem; that of deciding whether a given space is
contractible.
In this paper we offer a solution to the social choice problem over sets of alternatives
X ⊆ Rn defined by means of a collection of equality constraints1; that is, sets of the form
(1) X = {p ∈ Rn : gi(p) = ci for i = 1, . . . , m}
where the gi are differentiable maps from R
n into R. In contrast with the existing results, our
solution avoids the issues enumerated above: it is expressed in an elementary language which
does not involve any topological concepts, the hypotheses over the set of alternatives are also
elementary and easy to check, and the answer is ultimately given in terms of a standard
constrained optimization problem.
Although we will take the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal as our starting point, we
would like to remark that sets of the form (1) may well not be CW complexes, so the theorem
does not apply directly to them. Most of the work in this paper is aimed at developing new
mathematical techniques to overcome this difficulty.
1This class of sets is natural in Economics, but we emphasize that throughout the paper we shall make no
assumptions with an economical content or about the particular interpretation (should there be any) of the
variables and constraints that define X .
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Our first result provides a necessary condition for the social choice problem over X to have
a solution:
Theorem A. Consider any one of the constraints gi(p) = ci that define X . Suppose that
the set Yi ⊆ R
n defined by the remaining constraints is bounded, so that the map gi attains
both a global maximum and minimum value over Yi. Then it is necessary that ci coincides
with either of these for the social choice problem over X to have a solution.
We express the necessary condition of the theorem by saying that the constraint gi(p) = ci
must be optimal with respect to the other constraints, and say that X is optimally designed
if all the constraints for which Yi is bounded do indeed satisfy this condition.
2 With this
language Theorem A can be more expressively stated as follows: a social choice problem that
is not optimally designed will lead to a social choice paradox. Our choice of the word “design”
is intended to account for the fact that the values of the ci have to be carefully selected to
avoid a social choice paradox. By contrast, if the constraints gi(p) = ci are dictated by some
natural or random process (in a nontechnical sense of the word), in all likelihood the social
choice problem over X will have no solution.
It is now natural to ask whether optimal design is not only necessary but also sufficient
to avoid social choice paradoxes. Strictly speaking it is not, as shown by Example 10 in
Section 4. However, we will prove that such cases are exceptional, establishing the following:
Theorem B. A generic social choice problem that is designed optimally has a solution.
Roughly speaking, Theorem B means that for almost every function gi, choosing the value
ci of the constraint to be optimal with respect to the others will define a set X over which the
social choice problem can be solved. Admitting that the functions gi one may encounter in
practice fall into this generic category, we may summarize Theorems A and B in the following
imprecise but suggestive “principle of optimal design”:
A problem of social choice under equality constraints has a solution if, and only if, it is
optimally designed.
As announced earlier, the statement of this solution to the social choice problem is ele-
mentary and involves no topological notions whatsoever. Also, checking explicitly whether
a particular set X is optimally designed is a routine exercise in constrained optimization, so
this criterion is readily applicable.
On a more theoretical vein, if one broadly thinks of constrained optimization as one of
the concerns of Economics our results show that the latter discipline plays a crucial role in
2If Yi is not bounded then Theorem A says nothing about the corresponding ci.
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avoiding social choice paradoxes. We now illustrate this with a toy example which leads to
an interesting economical interpretation of the principle of optimal design.
Suppose that several agents Ai have to decide collectively on which particular bundle of
production factors a firm is going to use. These agents are not concerned with any economical
considerations whatsoever, but their choice is at least required to satisfy constraints dictated
by the production technology and the external demand. There is no reason to expect that
the set of alternatives determined by these constraints will be optimally designed, and so the
agents Ai will encounter a social choice paradox (Theorem A).
Now consider another agent B (say the owner of the firm) who is totally independent from
the agents Ai and, motivated only by economical considerations, measures the performance
of the firm through some utility function U and requires it to attain certain value u. This
adds one further constraint to the ones mentioned above and reduces the set of alternatives
among which the agents Ai can choose. Now:
(i) If agent B proceeds in the way that is economically rational, she will require the utility
level u to be the maximum allowed by the other constraints. Thus, the last constraint
will be optimal with respect to the remaining ones and (Theorem B) this will remove
the social choice paradox previously encountered by the agents Ai.
(ii) If agent B does not maximize the utility level but only requires it to attain certain
suboptimal value instead, the agents Ai will still encounter a social choice paradox
3
(Theorem A).
Let us summarize. The agents Ai face a social choice problem upon whose design they
cannot operate and their only goal is to perform their choice in a socially acceptable manner.
Agent B, who can partially design the set of alternatives but does not take part in the
actual social choice (at least not necessarily), is only concerned with the purely economical
problem of fixing the utility level u that the firm should achieve. These two problems are,
in principle, totally unrelated. The second one is solved axiomatically in Economics by
postulating that agent B behaves rationally and therefore maximizes U . What we have
shown is that by behaving in this way, and only by doing so, agent B simultaneously (and
possibly inadvertently) solves also the first problem, avoiding a social choice paradox. Thus
the two problems, in spite of their very different nature, have the same solution.4
3Actually, minimizing the utility would also avoid a social choice paradox. This alternative is perfectly
acceptable from a mathematical point of view but in the case under consideration it can be discarded on
economical grounds.
4It might be convenient to remark that this is very different from the situation usually considered in Welfare
Economics, where one maximizes a social welfare function which is some sort of average of the utility functions
of the individual ones. Here the utility function U of agentB is not assumed to bear any particular relationship
to the individual utilities of the agents Ai, which in fact play no role in our considerations.
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We finish this Introduction with a brief account of how the rest of the paper is organized.
In the following section we recall the basic definitions of the topological social choice model
and give the formal statements of Theorems A and B, which are Theorems 2 and 3. Their
proofs are given in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Since the arguments are somewhat involved,
in both cases we have tried to give first an outline of the main ideas that come into play.
Some technical lemmas are postponed to appendices A and B. Some notions from homotopy
theory, algebraic topology, differential geometry and Morse theory will be needed to follow
the arguments comfortably, especially from Section 4 onwards. We have included suitable
references where appropriate.
2. Formal statement of results
2.1. The topological social choice model. As mentioned earlier there are several models
of social choice in the literature, differing both in the nature of the input that the agents
provide the aggregation rule with and in the axioms that the latter is required to satisfy.
For instance, in the well known Arrowian model [1] each agent orders all the elements of X
and the aggregation rule yields another ordering that, in order to be socially acceptable, is
essentially required to be compatible with the orderings established by the agents. However,
since in our context X will in general consist of a continuum of alternatives, it does not seem
reasonable to require that the agents order all of them, but simply choose their favourite
one pi instead. An aggregation rule will therefore be a mapping F (p1, p2, . . . , pk) = p, where
the pi are the choices of the k agents and p is the social choice. Since the agents have
absolute freedom in choosing their preferred alternative, F should be defined for any tuple
(p1, p2, . . . , pk) ∈ X×
(k). . . ×X ; that is, it should be a mapping F : X× (k). . . ×X −→ X .
Moreover, it is natural to assume that the agents cannot distinguish between two alternatives
that are extremely close to each other and, as a consequence, switching from one to the other
should only cause a small change in the aggregate choice F (p1, . . . , pk). This is ensured if F
is continuous, and it is this property what is characteristic of the topological social choice
model introduced by Chichilnisky [6, 7] (for more details on this see [22, after Remark 2.3.1,
p. 6]). Finally, for the aggregation rule F to be socially acceptable, it is required to satisfy
the following two properties: (i) all the agents should be equally considered (anonimity), (ii)
if all the agents happen to choose the same element p ∈ X , then the aggregated choice should
be that same element p (unanimity).
Summarizing, a social choice function is a continuous mapping F : X× (k). . . ×X −→ X
that satisfies the following axioms:
(A) F (p1, p2, . . . , pk) should be independent of the ordering of the pi (anonimity).
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(U) F (p, p, . . . , p) = p for every p ∈ X (unanimity).
(Notice that it makes sense to speak of continuity since X is a subset of some Rn). An
aggregation rule F that satisfies the above three axioms is called a social choice function
over the given set of alternatives X . With this terminology, the social choice problem can be
stated as follows: given a set of alternatives X, does there exist a social choice function over
X?
When X is simple enough the existence of social choice functions can sometimes be eas-
ily established directly. For example, when X is a convex subset of Rn then the mean
F (p1, . . . , pk) :=
1
k
∑k
i=1 pi is a social choice function over X . Of course, it can no longer be
assured to be a social choice function over a set X defined by equality constraints because as
soon as any of the defining constraints is nonlinear the mean of two elements from X does
not need to belong to X again.5
By contrast, showing that a given set of alternatives X does not admit any social choice
function is a quite challenging mathematical problem even when X is a very simple set
such as the unit circumference in the plane R2 (a case analyzed by Chichilnisky [6] when
considering linear preferences on the commodity space of bundles of two collective goods). A
paper by Baigent [3] gives a rather complete idea of the argument starting from a minimal
mathematical background.
2.2. Our results. As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the social choice problem over
sets of alternatives X ⊆ Rn that are defined by a collection of equality constraints. Thus, let
there be a collection of smooth maps g1, . . . , gm : R
n −→ R and values c1, . . . , cm ∈ R which
determine the set of alternatives X as
X = {p ∈ Rn : gi(p) = ci for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
The constraints can be completely arbitrary (in particular, they do not need to be linear)
but we shall always assume that the set of alternatives X they determine is bounded, which
is a reasonable requisite in most problems that try to capture some aspect of reality. Of
course, for the social choice problem to make sense X should be nonempty. Also, if X is
finite then the problem has a somewhat trivial answer in the affirmative (see Section 4), so
the case of interest is when X is actually infinite. A convenient way of encapsulating these
considerations consists in requiring that the number of constraints m is strictly smaller than
the dimension of the ambient space n; that is, m < n.
5In passing, let us observe that if all the constraints defining X are linear then X is indeed a convex subset
of Rn and therefore the mean solves the social choice problem over X . This does not contradict our results
because none of the sets Yi obtained by removing one of the constraints is bounded.
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We will first consider an auxiliary base case assuming that the gi satisfy the standard
constraint qualifications ; that is, the gradients of the gi are linearly independent at each
p ∈ X . Then we will definitely run into a social choice paradox:
Proposition 1. Let the set of alternatives X be bounded, m < n, and assume that the gi
satisfy the constraint qualifications. Then the social choice problem over X has no solution.
Although the proof of Proposition 1 will be rather easy given the appropriate tools, it is
a quite useful result. For example, the classical case when X is a sphere can be analyzed
very easily: an (n− 1)–dimensional sphere is described by a single (m = 1) implicit equation
x21 + . . . + x
2
n = 1 in R
n which evidently satisfies the constraint qualifications, so the social
choice problem over spheres has no solution for n ≥ 2.
Sard’s theorem from differential geometry (see for instance [21, p. 227]) states that the set
of vectors (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ R
m for which the constraints gi(p) = ci do not satisfy the constraint
qualifications has Lebesgue measure zero. Otherwise stated, with probability one the values
ci that appear at the right hand side of the constraints gi(p) = ci are such that the gi satisfy
the constraint qualifications. It then follows from Proposition 1 that a generic social choice
problem under equality constraints will have no solution. This accords with the claim of
Theorem A that only problems that are designed in a very specific way (that is, optimally)
can be solved.
Let us move on to the precise statement of Theorem A. Observe that Proposition 1 entails
that, in order to have any hope of solving the social choice problem over X , it is necessary
that the gi do not satisfy the constraint qualifications. It will be enough to consider the
simplest case, when m − 1 of the constraints do satisfy them and it is only the addition
of the remaining one that spoils this condition. For definiteness we shall assume that it is
the first m− 1 constraints that satisfy the constraint qualifications; that is, the gradients of
g1, . . . , gm−1 are linearly independent at each point of the feasible set they determine
Ym = {p ∈ R
n : g1(p) = c1, . . . , gm−1(p) = cm−1}.
Having chosen the last constraint as the one on which we are going to focus, in the sequel
we shall safely omit the subindex from Ym and simply write Y without risk of confusion.
Then the precise statement of Theorem A is as follows:
Theorem 2. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that the first m−1
constraints satisfy the constraint qualifications.6 If the social choice problem over X has a
6Also, as a technical hypothesis, it is necessary to assume that gm|Y has only finitely many critical values.
This condition will be fulfilled in any problem with a reasonable economical interpretation, so in practice it is
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solution then the last constraint must be optimal with respect to the remaining ones; that is,
cm must be a global optimum of gm|Y .
The connectedness assumption on Y means that it consists only of a single “piece” and is
included just for convenience: if Y is not connected, that is, if it consists of several disjoint
pieces, then the conclusion of the theorem is that cm must be the global optimum value of
gm restricted to one of those pieces.
Now suppose that the first m − 1 constraints that define Y are already given (and, as
before, satisfy the constraint qualifications) and a designer, aware of the necessary condition
given by Theorem 2 and willing to avoid a social choice paradox, sets the value cm of the
last constraint to be optimal with respect to the others. Denote by C∞(Rn,R) the set of
all differentiable mappings g : Rn −→ R. Then the following result, which is the formal
counterpart of Theorem B from the Introduction, holds:
Theorem 3. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that the first
m− 1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualifications. There is an open and dense set M⊆
C∞(Rn,R) such that whenever gm belongs to M, setting the last constraint gm(p) = cm to be
optimal with respect to the others ensures that the social choice problem over X has a solution
in the affirmative.
The openness and density ofM can be interpreted intuitively as meaning that functions in
M are robust (a small perturbation of a function inM still belongs toM) and very abundant
(any function can be turned into a function in M by a perturbation as small as desired).
It is in this sense that the word “generic”, common in Functional Analysis, was used in the
statement of Theorem B.
3. The necessity of optimal design (proof of Theorem 2)
Since the proof of Theorem 2 is somewhat involved we have thought it convenient to begin
with an outline of the argument. This is the content of the first subsection, where we also
prove Proposition 1. After developing some auxiliary results in 3.2 and 3.3, the proof of the
theorem is finally given in subsection 3.4.
We will need the following two lemmas concerning the contractibility of manifolds:
Lemma 4. Let M be a compact manifold of dimension d ≥ 1 and without boundary. Then
none of the components of M is contractible.
barely stringent. For instance, it is automatically satisfied whenever gm is an analytic function (polynomials
being the simplest case).
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Lemma 5. Let M be a compact contractible manifold of dimension d ≥ 2. Then its boundary
∂M is nonempty (by the previous lemma) and connected.
In proving these lemmas it seems unavoidable to make use of homology with real coeffi-
cients, which is a powerful tool from algebraic topology. Since this machinery might not be
familiar to the reader, we have postponed the proof of both lemmas to Appendix A.
3.1. Outline of the argument. We will consider the whole family of social choice problems
that arise as cm runs in the real numbers, thus changing the set of alternatives X . To
emphasize that cm now plays the role of a parameter we shall replace it by u and reflect this
explicitly in the notation for X , letting
Xu = {p ∈ R
n : gi(p) = ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and gm(p) = u}.
This can be equivalently described as
Xu = {p ∈ Y : gm(p) = u},
where Y is the set defined by the first (m− 1) constraints as introduced earlier. If we denote
by umin and umax the global minimum and maximum values of gm over Y , Theorem 2 amounts
to the following statement:
(*) If u ∈ (umin, umax) then there is no social choice function over Xu.
We shall articulate the proof of (*) in two cases according to whether u is a regular or a
critical value of gm|Y . Recall that a point p ∈ Y is called a critical point of the restricted
map gm|Y if the gradient ∇gm(p) is a linear combination of {∇g1(p), . . . ,∇gm−1(p)}, and in
that case u = gm(p) is said to be a critical value of gm|Y . A value u that is not critical is
called regular.
Consider first the case when u is a regular value of gm|Y . This amounts to saying that
the gradients of g1, . . . , gm are all linearly independent at each p ∈ Xu; that is, the con-
straint qualifications are satisfied. This is precisely the situation considered in Proposition
1. Geometrically, it implies that (if nonempty) Xu is a differentiable manifold of dimension
d = n − m ≥ 1 without boundary (see for instance [10, Theorem 2.3, p. 213]). Now, any
differentiable manifold M (with or without boundary) is indeed a parafinite CW complex
because it can be triangulated, as shown by Whitehead [31] or Whitney [32, Theorem 12A,
p. 124]. Thus the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal directly reduces the problem to decid-
ing whether the components of Xu are contractible. The assumption that Xu is bounded,
together with the fact that Xu is closed in R
n, entails that Xu is compact. Hence we can
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apply Lemma 4 to M = Xu to learn that none of the components of Xu is contractible and
conclude that the social choice problem over Xu has no solution. This proves Proposition 1.
The above establishes (*) when u is a regular value of gm|Y , so we are left to consider the
case when u is a critical value of gm|Y ; that is, we need to prove
(**) If u ∈ (umin, umax) is a critical value of gm|Y , then there is no social choice function
over Xu.
This requires some hard work. The reason is that when u is a critical value of gm|Y there is
no guarantee thatXu is a manifold or even a CW complex anymore, and so we are not entitled
to apply neither the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal nor Lemma 4, as we did before, to
reach a conclusion. To illustrate this point one may consider the situation depicted in Figure
1.(a), where X ⊆ R3 is defined by two constraints. The first constraint alone defines a surface
Y . Let the other constraint be given by the map g2(x, y, z) = z. The Z axis is represented
vertically, so the various sets Xu are simply the intersections of Y with horizontal planes
at height u. The critical points of g2|Y are p and q (and possibly others not shown in the
picture) and u is a critical value of g2|Y because Xu contains the critical point p. Observe
that Xu is an “eight-figure” (two circumferences having a single point in common), which is
not a manifold as mentioned earlier.7
Y
p
q
u1
u
u2
(a)
Xu1
Xu
Xu2
X[u1,u2]
(b)
Figure 1.
To establish (**) we will argue by contradiction. Suppose that there does exist a social
choice function over Xu where, we recall, umin < u < umax and u is a critical value of gm|Y .
Pick two numbers u1 and u2 such that umin < u1 < u < u2 < umax and consider the auxiliary
set
X[u1,u2] = {p ∈ Y : u1 ≤ gm(p) ≤ u2}.
7In this simple drawing Xu is still a CW–complex, but in more complicated situations this need not be the
case.
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One can always choose u1 and u2 to be regular values of gm|Y , and this guarantees that the
set M = X[u1,u2] is a compact manifold whose boundary ∂M is the disjoint union of Xu1 and
Xu2, where as usual
Xu1 = {p ∈ Y : gm(p) = u1} and Xu2 = {p ∈ Y : gm(p) = u2}.
In our illustrative example of Figure 1 the set X[u1,u2] is the region of Y comprised between
heights u1 and u2, as shown in panel (b), and Xu1 and Xu2 are the bottom and top “rims” of
X[u1,u2], respectively. We will prove that:
(i) With an appropriate choice of u1 and u2 the social choice function that exists over Xu
by assumption can “almost” be extended to another one defined on all X[u1,u2].
(ii) As a consequence of (i) and the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal applied to the ma-
nifold M = X[u1,u2], it follows that the latter must be contractible and therefore its
boundary ∂M must be connected by Lemma 5. However, since ∂M is the disjoint
union of Xu1 and Xu2 , at least one of them must be empty.
We reach a contradiction from (ii) as follows. Since Y is compact and connected, gm(Y ) ⊆ R
is also compact and connected, so it is a compact interval. Therefore gm(Y ) = [umin, umax].
In particular both u1 and u2 belong to gm(Y ), and this implies that both Xu1 and Xu2 are
nonempty. This contradicts (ii), showing that the assumption that there is a social choice
function over Xu is untenable and completing the proof of Theorem 2.
Both (i) and (ii) are, in fact, more delicate than they seem. First, it may not always be
possible to extend a social choice function originally defined only on Xu to a social choice
function defined on the larger set X[u1,u2]. We shall see, however, that it is always possible
to extend it at the homotopy level (hence the use of the word “almost” in step (i) above).
This will prompt the introduction of homotopy social choice functions below, a notion which
is slightly weaker than that of a true social choice function but still good enough for our
purposes. Secondly, in step (ii) the application of the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal only
shows that each component ofX[u1,u2] must be contractible, but maybe not X[u1,u2] as a whole.
Thus we can only conclude that each component of X[u1,u2] has a connected boundary, which
does not directly lead to a contradiction and therefore will require a more detailed analysis
of the situation.
As mentioned in the statement of Theorem 2, we will need to assume that gm|Y has at
most finitely many critical values (notice that since many critical points may correspond to
the same critical value, gm|Y may well have infinitely many critical points in spite of having
only finitely many critical values as required).
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Note. For the sake of brevity, from now on we shall sometimes abbreviate “social choice
function” as SCF.
3.2. Homotopy social choice functions. Let us recast the conditions of unanimity and
anonimity in a slightly different but well known equivalent way. Suppose F is an SCF for k
agents on a space of alternatives X . Denote by the letter ∆ the diagonal map
∆ : X −→ Xk ; ∆(p) = (p, p, . . . , p)
and by the letter P any permutation map P : Xk −→ Xk. The conditions of unanimity (U)
and anonimity (A) on F can then be equivalently stated as
(U) F ◦∆ = id,
(A) F ◦ P = F for any permutation map P .
As it turns out, the proof of the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal works equally well if
(U) and (A) only hold at the homotopy level; that is, if they are replaced by
(HU) F ◦∆ ≃ id,
(HA) F ◦ P ≃ F for any permutation map P ,
where ≃ denotes the homotopy relation between maps. The reason is that, when one considers
the maps F ∗, ∆∗ and P ∗ induced by F , ∆ and P between homotopy groups, unanimity (U)
and its homotopical counterpart (HU) yield the same relation F ∗ ◦ ∆∗ = id, and the same
goes for (A) and (HA) (namely, F ∗◦P ∗ = F ∗). Since it is only these relations that are needed
to conclude that the components of X are contractible, our assertion follows.
For the sake of brevity let us call a continuous map F : Xk −→ X a homotopy SCF
(for k agents) if it satisfies conditions (HU) and (HA) above. These functions are not to be
interpreted in any intuitive sense, but just as mathematical objects that will be useful to
prove Theorem 2. Our discussion may be summed up in the following
Lemma 6. Let M be a compact differentiable manifold. Assume there exist homotopy social
choice functions overM for any number of agents. Then each component ofM is contractible.
3.3. An extension result. Now we are going to establish the extension result mentioned in
(i) in page 11; namely, that an SCF on Xu can be extended to a homotopy SCF on X[u1,u2].
Let u be a critical value of gm|Y and suppose that it is not a global optimum, so that
umin < u < umax. As a consequence of the technical assumption that gm|Y only has finitely
many critical values we may choose u1, u2 ∈ [umin, umax] such that u1 < u < u2 and u is the
only critical value of gm|Y on the interval [u1, u2].
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Proposition 7. Let u1 and u2 be chosen as above. If there exists a social choice function F
for k agents on Xu, then there exists a homotopy social choice function F
′ for k agents on
X[u1,u2].
The proof of the proposition needs Lemmas 8 and 9, which we state now. Their proofs are
postponed to Appendix B, since they are slightly technical.
Lemma 8. There exist a neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1,u2] and a continuous function FU :
Uk −→ X[u1,u2] with the properties
(1) FU(p, . . . , p) = p,
(2) FU(p1, . . . , pk) is independent of the ordering of the pi.
Notice that FU is close to being an SCF on U (it is certainly unanimous and anonymous),
but it does not qualify as such because its target space is X[u1,u2] rather than U . To remedy
this we shall make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 9. Given any neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1,u2] there exists a continuous mapping
r : X[u1,u2] −→ X[u1,u2] such that:
(1) r(p) ∈ U for every p ∈ X[u1,u2],
(2) r is homotopic to the identity in X[u1,u2].
Now we put these two results together to prove Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. Apply Lemma 8 to find U and FU ; then apply Lemma 9 to the U just
obtained to get r. Define F ′ : Xk[u1,u2] −→ X[u1,u2] by
F ′(p1, . . . , pk) := FU(r(p1), . . . , r(pk)).
Notice that the definition is correct: all the r(pi) belong to U and therefore it makes sense to
evaluate FU on the k–tuple (r(p1), . . . , r(pk)).
We claim that F ′ is a homotopy SCF on X[u1,u2]. Clearly F
′ is insensitive to the ordering
of its arguments because the same is true of FU , so (HA) holds. Also, composing F
′ with the
diagonal map ∆(p) = (p, . . . , p) yields
F ′ ◦∆(p) = FU(r(p), . . . , r(p)) = r(p),
and since r ≃ id in X[u1,u2], we see that
F ′ ◦∆ ≃ id.
This establishes property (HU) and shows that F ′ is indeed a homotopy SCF. 
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3.4. The proof of Theorem 2. We only need to prove (**). To argue by contradiction
assume that there exists an SCF over Xu where umin < u < umax is a critical value of gm|Y .
Choose u1 and u2 satisfying umin < u1 < u < u2 < umax and such that u is the only critical
value of gm|Y in the interval [u1, u2] (this is possible because of the technical assumption that
gm|Y only has finitely many critical values). The set X[u1,u2] is then a manifold because both
u1 and u2 are regular values of gm|Y . It is clearly compact and its dimension is the same as
that of Y , which is d = n − (m − 1) ≥ 2 because of the condition m < n. The boundary of
X[u1,u2] is the disjoint union of Xu1 and Xu2. We proved earlier, using the connectedness and
compactness of Y , that both Xu1 and Xu2 are nonempty.
By Proposition 7 the SCF that exists overXu by assumption can be extended to a homotopy
SCF on X[u1,u2]. As a consequence of Lemma 6 it follows that each component C of X[u1,u2]
is contractible, and so its boundary ∂C is connected by Lemma 5. In particular, for each C
we have that ∂C must be entirely contained in either Xu1 or Xu2. Thus, letting
P := ∪{C : C connected component of X[u1,u2] such that ∂C ⊆ Xu1}
and
Q := ∪{C : C connected component of X[u1,u2] such that ∂C ⊆ Xu2}
we have thatX[u1,u2] is the disjoint union of P and Q. Notice that both P and Q are nonempty
because both Xu1 and Xu2 are nonempty too.
Pick points p ∈ P and q ∈ Q. Since Y is a connected (by assumption) manifold, it is also
path connected. Thus there exists a continuous path γ : [0, 1] −→ Y such that γ(0) = p and
γ(1) = q. Since γ starts in P and ends in Q and P and Q are disjoint, there exist a number
tP when γ last belongs to P and a number tQ > tP when γ first hits Q. Formally these are
tP := sup {t ∈ [0, 1] : γ(t) ∈ P} and tQ := inf {t ∈ [tP , 1] : γ(t) ∈ Q}.
Observe the following:
(a) By definition, γ(t) 6∈ X[u1,u2] for every t ∈ (tP , tQ).
(b) By continuity γ must exit P through its boundary and similarly enter Q through its
boundary, so γ(tP ) ∈ ∂P and γ(tQ) ∈ ∂Q.
The definition of P and Q together with (b) above imply that gm(γ(tP )) = u1 and
gm(γ(tQ)) = u2. Consider the set gm(γ([tP , tQ])). It is a connected, compact subset of
R, so it must be a compact interval. Since it contains gm(γ(tP )) = u1 and gm(γ(tQ)) = u2,
it must also contain u. Thus there exists t∗ ∈ [tP , tQ] such that gm(γ(t∗)) = u, which means
that γ(t∗) belongs to Xu and therefore also to X[u1,u2]. This contradicts (a) above and finishes
the proof of Theorem 2.
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4. The sufficiency of optimal design (Theorem 3)
We begin by presenting a trivial example that illustrates how the optimality condition of
Theorem 2 is generally not sufficient to avoid a social choice paradox:
Example 10. Consider the set of alternatives
X = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : (x2 + y2 + z2 + 3)2 − 16(x2 + y2) = 0 , z = 1}.
It is easy to check that the second constraint is optimal with respect to the first one, so the
necessary condition provided by Theorem 2. (Notice that the set Y2 defined by the second
constraint alone is not bounded, so Theorem 2 does not require the first constraint to be
optimal with respect to the second one.) A straightforward computation shows that X is a
circumference of radius 2 centered at (0, 0, 1) and contained in the plane z = 1. However,
circumferences do not admit social choice functions. 
Let us explain now more carefully the statement of Theorem 3. Consider once more the
bounded set Y defined by the first m − 1 constraints alone. These should be thought of
as being fixed once and for all, and we imagine that the last constraint gm(p) = cm is a
parameter so that the map gm and the number cm can vary, yielding a whole family of sets of
alternatives Xcmgm . However, since we are only interested in the case when the last constraint
is optimal with respect to the others, for each map gm there are only two possible choices
of cm: either the global maximum c
max
m or the global minimum c
min
m of gm|Y . The content of
Theorem 3 is that for most choices of gm both possibilities lead to a set of alternatives where
the social choice problem has a solution.
Let us formalize this idea. For any smooth map gm : R
n −→ R denote cmaxm = max gm|Y
and cminm = min gm|Y (since Y is bounded by assumption, these two numbers are well defined)
and consider the two sets of alternatives
Xmaxgm = {p ∈ R
n : g1(p) = c1, . . . , gm−1(p) = cm−1, gm(p) = c
max
m }
and
Xmingm = {p ∈ R
n : g1(p) = c1, . . . , gm−1(p) = cm−1, gm(p) = c
min
m }.
With this notation, Theorem 3 can be stated in more detail as follows:
Theorem 3′. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that the first
m− 1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualifications. There is a set M⊆ C∞(Rn,R) which
is open and dense (with the strong C2–topology) and such that, when gm belongs to this set,
the social choice problems over both Xmaxgm and X
min
gm
admit a solution.
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The intuitive interpretation of the openness and density properties ofM was mentioned in
Section 2 and captures the idea of “genericity”. The strong C2–topology can be most easily
described by saying that two functions g1, g2 are ǫ–close when the functions themselves,
together with their derivatives up to second order, differ by no more than ǫ at each point of
R
n.
4.1. Outline of the argument. The basic idea behind Theorem 3 is that, when the last
constraint is optimal with respect to the others and gm ∈ M, the set of alternatives X
actually reduces to a finite number of points, and in this case there do exist social choice
functions over X . To see why this last assertion is true, begin by labelling the finitely many
alternatives (that is, the elements of X) in any order. Then, given the bundle of individual
preferences (p1, . . . , pk), simply let F (p1, . . . , pk) be that alternative, among those that appear
in (p1, . . . , pk), having the highest label. It is easy to check that F is anonymous, unanimous
and (trivially) continuous, so it is a social choice function over X . (It is, however, questionable
to what extent such a function is actually of interest in the realm of social choice.)
We now need to recall a couple of definitions pertaining to Morse theory. Let M be a
compact, boundariless manifold, and let h : M −→ R be a smooth function (eventually we
will take M = Y and h = gm|Y ). A critical point p ∈ M for h is said to be nondegen-
erate if the matrix of second partial derivatives of h at p is nonsingular; that is, it has a
nonzero determinant8. The map h itself is called a Morse function if all its critical points are
nondegenerate.
By their very definition, nondegenerate critical points of a map h have the property that
the quadratic term in the Taylor expansion of h around them is either definite or indefinite,
but not semidefinite. In particular, every such critical point is isolated in the sense that it
has neighbourhood U that contains no other critical point. Therefore, a Morse function on a
compact manifold M can only have finitely many critical points altogether (see for instance
[23, Corollary 2.19, p. 47]). This has the following consequence:
Proposition 11. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that the first
m − 1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualifications. In addition, suppose that gm|Y is a
Morse function. Then, if the last constraint is optimal with respect to the others, the social
choice problem over X has a solution.
8One would express h in local coordinates around p and construct the matrix of second partial derivatives of
this local expression. Whether or not this matrix has a nonzero determinant turns out to be independent of
the coordinates used to compute it, and this makes the above definition valid. The interested reader can find
more information about this in [23, Chapter 2, pp. 33ff.]
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Proof. Every point in X is a critical point of gm|Y because of the assumption about the
optimality of the last constraint with respect to the others. Since Y is a compact manifold
and Morse functions on compact manifolds have only finitely many critical points, it follows
that X is finite. This implies that the social choice problem over X indeed has a solution, as
discussed above. 
Remark 12. Suppose that the set X is designed by an agent willing to avoid a social choice
paradox. To satisfy the necessary optimality condition the agent would solve the constrained
optimization problem
(P ) :


optimize gm(p)
subject to p ∈ Y ; that is,
g1(p) = c1, . . . , gm−1(p) = cm−1
which is an elementary problem in optimization theory which is commonly solved by means
of the Lagrangian function
L(λ1, . . . , λm−1, p) = gm(p)−
m−1∑
i=1
λi (gi(p)− ci) .
It is easy to show that: (i) critical points of gm|Y correspond exactly to (unconstrained) critical
points of L and (ii) the Hessian of gm|Y is nonsingular at a critical point if and only if the
same is true of the Hessian of L. Thus, the condition laid out in Proposition 11 that gm|Y be
a Morse function can be restated in the following familiar and explicitly checkable form: at
every critical point of L, the Hessian of L has a nonzero determinant.
Consider the set
M := {g ∈ C∞(Rn,R) : g|Y is a Morse function}.
According to Proposition 11, whenever gm belongs to M the social choice problem over
both Xmaxgm and X
min
gm
has a solution. Therefore, to establish Theorem 3 we only need to show
thatM is open and dense in C∞(Rn,R). It is well known that Morse functions on a manifold,
in this case Y , form and open and dense subset of C∞(Y,R) (this can be proved by combining
[23, Lemma 2.26, p. 52] and [23, Theorem 2.20, p. 47]). However, this does not quite accord
to our present situation since we are interested in functions g defined on all of Rn (rather
than only on Y ) and whose restriction to Y is a Morse function. Thus there is still some
work left to do, and we devote the following subsection to some preparatory results in this
direction.
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4.2. Density of Morse functions. Suppose M is a submanifold of some Rn and g : M −→
R is a smooth function. Consider linear perturbations h of g of the form
M ∋ (x1, . . . , xn)
h
7−→ g(x1, . . . , xn)− a1x1 − . . .− anxn ∈ R
for some coefficients a1, . . . , an ∈ R. We are going to prove that these linear perturbations h
are almost always Morse functions on M . More precisely:
Proposition 13. Denote by (x1, . . . , xn) the standard Cartesian coordinates of R
n. Let M ⊆
R
n be a closed smooth manifold and let g : M −→ R be a smooth function. Then the set of
vectors (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
n for which the linearly perturbed map
h(x1, . . . , xn) := g(x1, . . . , xn)− a1x1 − . . .− anxn
has some degenerate critical point on M (that is, h is not a Morse function) has Lebesgue
measure zero.
The proof requires an auxiliary result, which is essentially [23, Lemma 2.26, p. 52]. We
state it in a slightly stronger form that follows immediately from its proof (see, in particular,
how the coefficients ai are chosen in [23, p. 50] using Sard’s theorem):
Lemma. LetM be a closed smooth manifold of dimension d and let U ⊆M be a coordinate
chart with coordinates (y1, . . . , yd) [thus a point q ∈ U has coordinates (y1(q), . . . , yd(q)) ∈
R
d]. Let f : U −→ R be any smooth function. Then, the set of vectors (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ R
d for
which the map
U ∋ q 7−→ f(q)− a1y1(q) + . . .− adyd(q)
has some degenerate critical point in U has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof of Proposition 13. Let d be the dimension of M . Pick a point p ∈ M and con-
sider TpM , the subspace tangent to M at p. This is a d–dimensional subspace of R
n, so
there exist d coordinates among x1, . . . , xn that parameterize the points in TpM , and we as-
sume for notational convenience that these coordinates are x1, . . . , xd. The projection map
π : (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ (x1, . . . , xd) then restricts to an isomorphism of TpM onto R
d. As a
consequence of the inverse function theorem, p has an open neighbourhood U in M such that
π|U : U −→ π(U) ⊆ R
d is a diffeomorphism onto its image; that is, (x1, . . . , xd) provides a
coordinate system on U .
Let K ⊆ U be a compact neighbourhood of p and consider the set
AK =
{
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
n : g −
∑
i
aixi has at least one degenerate critical point on K
}
.
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Clearly AK is a closed set. We are going to show that it has measure zero. To this end we
shall consider the intersections of AK with the subspaces of R
n that result from fixing the last
n− d+ 1 components of (a1, . . . , an), and show that each of these intersections has measure
zero as a subset of Rd. The fact that AK is a Borel set (because it is closed) then implies
that AK itself has measure zero. (This is essentially Cavalieri’s principle; a particular case of
Tonelli’s iterated integration theorem: see for instance [9, Theorem 5.1.4, p. 145].)
Fix, then, values a0d+1, . . . , a
0
n and consider the auxiliary map f := g −
∑n
i=d+1 a
0
ixi. In
terms of f we may write the intersection AK ∩{ad+1 = a
0
d+1, . . . , an = a
0
n}, viewed as a subset
of Rd, as
(2)
{
(a1, . . . , ad) ∈ R
d : f −
d∑
i=1
aixi has at least one degenerate critical point on K
}
.
Although the map f is defined on all of M , we are only interested in its behaviour on
U , where the coordinates (x1, . . . , xd) are valid. Evidently the intersection AK ∩ {ad+1 =
a0d+1, . . . , an = a
0
n}, as described by Equation (2), is contained in{
(a1, . . . , ad) ∈ R
d : f −
d∑
i=1
aixi has at least one degenerate critical point on U
}
and this set has measure zero according to the lemma stated just before this proposition
(applied to the coordinate system (y1, . . . , yd) = (x1, . . . , xd)). Consequently its subset AK ∩
{ad+1 = a
0
d+1, . . . , an = a
0
n} has measure zero too. This is true for any (a
0
d+1, . . . , a
0
n) so AK
has measure zero by Cavalieri’s principle, as argued earlier.
Now we can easily finish the proof of the proposition. Performing the above construction for
every p ∈ M yields a family of compact neighbourhoods Kp of p such that the corresponding
AKp has measure zero. Since M is compact, one may cover it with only finitely many of
the Kp; say Kp1 , . . . , Kpr . Then the set A :=
⋃r
j=1AKpj is closed, has measure zero, and any
(a1, . . . , an) 6∈ A satisfies, by construction, that it does not have any degenerate critical points
in any of the Kp and so it does not have any degenerate critical points in M , as was to be
shown. 
4.3. The proof of Theorem 3. As mentioned earlier, we only need to show that the set
M = {g ∈ C∞(Rn,R) : g|Y is a Morse function}
is open and dense in C∞(Rn,R).
(1) Openness. Pick a map g ∈ M, so that g|Y is a Morse function. This means that
g|Y has only finitely many critical points and the Hessian of g|Y is nonsingular (computed
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in some, and hence any, coordinate system) at each of them. Recall that the critical points
of g|Y are precisely those p ∈ Y where the gradient of g is perpendicular to Y . Let U be a
neighbourhood of the critical points of g|Y so small that (condition (i)) the Hessian of g|Y is
nonsingular everywhere in U . Notice also that since g|Y has no critical points outside U by
construction the gradient of g is never perpendicular to Y outside U (condition (ii)). Since
both (i) and (ii) depend only on the first and second derivatives of g, they are clearly satisfied
for any sufficiently small perturbation of g in the C2–topology. Thus M is an open subset of
C∞(Rn,R).
(2) Density. We have to show that given any g ∈ C∞(Rn,R) and any ǫ > 0 there is
g′ ∈ C∞(Rn,R) that is ǫ–close to g and such that g′ ∈ M; that is, g′|Y is a Morse function.
This is a relatively straightforward application of Proposition 13, but some care has to be
exercised. Let V be an compact neighbourhood of Y in Rn and pick a smooth function
θ : Rn −→ [0, 1] such that θ|Y ≡ 1 and θ ≡ 0 outside V . Consider the map
g′(x1, . . . , xn) := g(x1, . . . , xn)− θ(x1, . . . , xn) ·
∑
i
aixi.
We claim that g − g′ and its derivatives up to second order (with respect to the xi) can be
made everywhere less than ǫ just by taking all the ai sufficiently small. Let us consider, for
instance, its second derivatives. A straightforward computation shows that
(3)
∂2
∂xk∂xj
(g − g′) =
∂2θ
∂xk∂xj
·
∑
i
aixi +
∂θ
∂xj
ak +
∂θ
∂xk
aj.
Since θ is constant outside V , all the partial derivatives of θ vanish there and therefore the
same is true of whole right hand side of Equation (3). Since V is compact, all the partial
derivatives of θ are be bounded above on V by some constant S. Also, there exists a number
R such that V is entirely contained in the cube of side 2R centered at the origin; that is,
|xi| ≤ R whenever (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V . Then the absolute value of the right hand side of
Equation 3 can be bounded above by SR
∑
i |ai| + S|ak| + S|aj|. This makes it clear that
choosing all the components of (a1, . . . , an) to satisfy |ai| < δ for a suitable δ > 0 one can
achieve that g′ is ǫ–close to g in the C2–topology.
Finally, notice that by construction g′ = g −
∑
i aixi on Y . According to Proposition 13
the set A of vectors (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
n for which this the restriction g′|Y is a Morse function
on Y has full measure in Rn. In particular, A has a nonempty intersection with the open
cube centered at the origin and with diameter δ, and for any (a1, . . . , an) in that intersection
one has that g′|Y is a Morse function and g
′ is ǫ–close to g. This finishes the proof.
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5. Appendix A: proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5
In this appendix we establish Lemmas 4 and 5. As mentioned earlier, we need to use some
homology theory. Since this topic is rather elaborate we cannot even recall here the basic
definitions, so we refer the interested reader to the book by Hatcher [17] and limit ourselves
to state the results that we need.
To any space U we may assign a sequence of (real) vector spaces Hj(U ;R) for j = 0, 1, 2, . . .
which capture some geometric information about U . These are called the j–dimensional
homology groups of U (even though they are actually vector spaces) with coefficients in the
real numbers. For simplicity we shall just speak of the homology groups of U and denote
them Hj(U), supressing R from the notation.
The following properties hold:
(a) The dimension of H0(U) is the number of path connected components of U .
(b) If U is contractible, then H0(U) = R and Hj(U) = {0} for every j ≥ 1.
(c) Poincare´ duality: if U is a compact, boundariless manifold of dimension d, then
Hj(U) = Hd−j(U) for every j.
With these properties, the proof of Lemma 4 reduces to a simple computation:
Proof of Lemma 4. Let U be a connected component of M . Then U is itself a compact
manifold of dimension d ≥ 1 and without boundary. We have H0(U ;R) = R by (a) above,
because U is connected. By Poincare´ duality Hd(U ;R) = H0(U ;R) = R, and it follows from
(b) that U is not contractible, because it has a homology group of dimension ≥ 1 (namely,
its d–dimensional homology group) which is nonzero. 
The proof of the second lemma requires the use of relative homology groups, which are
defined not just for a space U but for a pair (U, U0) formed by a space U and a subset U0
of U . For each j = 0, 1, 2, . . . there is a real vector space Hj(U, U0) called the j–dimensional
relative homology group of the pair (U, U0) with coefficients in the real numbers. There is a
relation between the relative homology of a pair (U, U0) and the homology groups of both U
and U0 which is expressed by a so-called long exact sequence as follows. For each dimension j
there are linear maps Hj(U0) −→ Hj(U), Hj(U) −→ Hj(U, U0) and Hj(U, U0) −→ Hj−1(U0)
that fit into a sequence
. . . −→ H2(U) −→ H2(U, U0) −→ H1(U0) −→ H1(U) −→ H1(U, U0) −→ {0}
(which continues to the left in the same fashion) having the property of being exact : the
image of the map entering any one of the terms of the sequence coincides with the kernel of
the map connecting that term to the one to its right.
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In addition to this, we shall also make use of
(d) Lefschetz duality: if U is a compact manifold (with boundary) of dimension d, then
Hj(U, ∂U) = Hd−j(U) for every j.
Proof of Lemma 5. Since M is contractible and d−1 ≥ 1 by assumption, property (b) entails
that Hd−1(M) = {0}. By Lefschetz duality (applied to U = M) one then has H1(M, ∂M) =
Hd−1(M) = {0}. Again from (b) one also has H0(M) = R.
Consider the following portion of the long exact sequence for the pair (M, ∂M):
H1(M, ∂M)
α
−→ H0(∂M)
β
−→ H0(M)
γ
−→ {0}
which, taking into account the previous paragraph, reads
{0}
α
−→ H0(∂M)
β
−→ R
γ
−→ {0}.
Clearly both α and γ must be the zero homomorphisms, so the image of α is zero and the
kernel of γ is all of its source space R. Thus by the exactness of the sequence, the kernel of β
is zero too, so that β is injective, and the image of β is R. Hence β establishes an isomorphism
between H0(∂M) and R. Using (a) we conclude that ∂M is connected. 
6. Appendix B: proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9
6.1. Proof of Lemma 8. It is both notationally and conceptually simpler to prove a slightly
more general result, from which Lemma 8 follows letting M = X[u1,u2] and Z = Xu:
Lemma 14. Let M be a compact manifold and Z ⊆ M a closed subset of M . Suppose
F : Zk −→ Z is an SCF over Z. Then there exist a neighbourhood U of Z in M and a
continuous map FU : U
k −→M such that FU is unanimous and anonymous.
Proof. Think of F as a mapping F : Zk −→ M and extend it setting F (p, . . . , p) = p for
every p ∈M . Now its domain is
D := Zk ∪ {(p, . . . , p) : p ∈M},
which is a compact subset of Mk. Clearly F is still continuous on this new larger domain D.
Consider the quotient space obtained from Mk by identifying, via an equivalence relation
∼, each k–tuple (p1, . . . , pk) with all of its permutations. We shall denote π :M
k −→ Mk/ ∼
the canonical projection. The set D projects onto a compact subset π(D) of Mk/ ∼. In
turn the map F , due to its invariance under permutation of its arguments, descends to a
continuous map
F¯ : π(D) −→ M.
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Now we make use of the following extension result: every continuous map from a closed
subset of a metric space into a manifoldM can be extended to a continuous map defined on a
neighbourhood W of the subset (see for instance [19, Proposition 8.3, p. 47]). Applying this
result to the closed subset π(D) of the metric space Mk/ ∼ and the map F¯ we see that the
latter can be extended continuously to a neighbourhoodW of π(D) inMk/ ∼. For notational
ease the extension will still be denoted F¯ .
The set π−1(W ) is a neighbourhood of D in Mk, so in particular it is a neighbourhood of
Zk. It is easy to see that there exists a neighbourhood U of Z in M such that Uk ⊆ π−1(W ).
Then the map
FU : U
k −→M ; FU(p1, . . . , pk) = (F¯ ◦ π)(p1, . . . , pk)
provides the desired extension: it is clearly continuous and unanimous, and it is also anony-
mous because any two permutations of a k–tuple (p1, . . . , pk) are projected by π onto the
same element of Mk/ ∼. 
6.2. Proof of Lemma 9. The construction of the map r is rather indirect: we shall define
a tangent vectorfield on Y , consider the flow ϕ that it generates and then use ϕ to define r.
This approach is closely related to Morse theory, and a quick glance at the book by Milnor
[24, pp. 12 and 13] may be useful. Some acquaintance with differential geometry is required
to follow the argument.
Recall that Y ⊆ Rn is a differentiable manifold defined by the constraints gi(p) = ci
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1. At any point p ∈ Y their gradients are all orthogonal to Y or,
otherwise stated, the tangent space to Y at p is the subspace of Rn orthogonal to all the
{∇gi(p) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1}. Denote V (p) the projection of ∇gm(p) onto that tangent space,
thus obtaining a tangent vectorfield p 7−→ V (p) on Y . This vectorfield V (p) can be given
a very rough but rather helpful intuitive interpretation: inasmuch as ∇gm(p) tells us the
direction along which f increases most quickly, its projection V (p) tells us in what direction
we should advance to obtain the quickest increase of gm while remaining in Y .
Assertion 1. V (p) is zero precisely when p is a critical point of gm|Y .
Proof. Notice that V (p) is zero precisely when ∇gm(p) is orthogonal to Y at p; that is to say,
precisely when ∇gm(p) is a linear combination of the gradients {∇gi(p) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1} or,
equivalently, when p is a critical point of gm|X . 
Assertion 2. The scalar product ∇gm(p) · V (p) is always nonnegative and it is actually
positive when p is not a critical point of gm|Y .
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Proof. Observe that by construction the angle between ∇gm(p) and V (p) is at most ninety
degrees, so the scalar product ∇gm(p) · V (p) is always nonnegative. Together with Assertion
1, this proves the result. 
Using V (p) we define a new tangent vectorfield W : p 7−→ (u − gm(p))V (p). Let ϕ :
Y × R −→ Y be the flow generated on Y by the vectorfield W . Notice that, since Y is
compact, ϕ is globally defined.
To gain some geometric intuition consider again the situation shown in Figure 1. Recall
that g2(x, y, z) = z, so its gradient is the constant vector (0, 0, 1). The vectorfield V (p) points,
at each p ∈ Y , in the direction that yields the quickest increase in height while remaining
within Y . The vector field W (p) is obtained multiplying V (p) by the modulating factor
u − g2(p) = u − z, which is zero precisely on Xu, negative above Xu and positive below
Xu. Taking into account these signs, W (p) is zero on Xu, points in the direction of quickest
descent if p is above Xu, and points in the direction of quickest ascent if p is below Xu. The
vectors W (p) also become shorter as p approaches Xu, since the factor u − g2(p) becomes
closer to zero. Figure 2provides a sketch of W (p) (shown as arrows tangent to X[u1,u2]) and
of some of the trajectories of the flow ϕ obtained by integrating W (p).
If we follow the directions ofW (p), starting at any point p, it seems intuitively clear that we
will move towards Xu advancing ever more slowly, since W (p) (which is our speed) becomes
smaller the closer we get to Xu. Unless p ∈ Xu, in which case we would actually stay still
since W (p) = 0, we would approach Xu asymptotically but never get there. In any case,
there will be a finite time tp at which we will enter any prescribed neighbourhood U of Xu
and never leave it again. The map r that we are looking for will essentially be defined as
r(p) = the point we reach at time tp. In our trip from p to r(p) we might follow a simple path
like the ones shown to the left side of the drawing or, possibly, a much more complicated one
which approaches Xu spiralling around it or in some other strange fashion.
X[u1,u2]
Figure 2.
Let us go back to mathematics again. The following proposition collects some properties
of ϕ that are the formal counterparts of the ideas just described:
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Proposition 15. The flow ϕ has the following properties:
(1) For every q ∈ X[u1,u2] and every t ≥ 0, the point ϕ(q, t) belongs to X[u1,u2] too.
(2) For every neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1,u2] there exists T > 0 such that ϕ(q, t) ∈ U
for every q ∈ X[u1,u2] and every t ≥ T .
In the parlance of dynamical systems, (1) means that X[u1,u2] is positively invariant under
ϕ and (2) states that Xu is a stable attractor in X[u1,u2]. As a preparation to prove the
proposition we are going to investigate some qualitative properties of the trajectories of ϕ.
Fix a point q ∈ X[u1,u2] and let γ be the trajectory of ϕ with initial condition γ(0) = q (in
terms of the flow, γ(t) = ϕ(q, t)). More explicitly, γ : R −→ Y is a smooth curve in Y which
satisfies γ(0) = q and
dγ
dt
(t) =W (γ(t))
for every t ∈ R (that is, γ is an integral curve of the vectorfield W ). We are interested in the
behaviour of γ(t) for t ≥ 0, and for definiteness we consider the case u < f(q) ≤ u2.
Assertion 3. The inequality u < gm(γ(t)) holds for every t ∈ R.
Proof. Each point of Xu is a zero of W and therefore a fixed point of the flow ϕ. Since the
trajectory γ goes through the point q, which does not belong to Xu, it follows that γ(t) 6∈ Xu
for every t ∈ R. Consider the map t 7−→ (gm ◦ γ)(t). By what we have just seen, it never
attains the value u, so (as it continuous) it must be the case that gm(γ(t)) is either always
> u or < u. Since we have taken gm(q) > u, it follows that gm(γ(t)) 6= u for every t ∈ R. 
Assertion 4. The inequality gm(γ(t)) ≤ u2 holds for every t ≥ 0.
Proof. Using the chain rule we compute the time derivative of the map t 7−→ (gm ◦ γ)(t) as
follows:
d
dt
(gm ◦ γ)(t) = ∇gm(γ(t)) ·
dγ
dt
(t) = ∇gm(γ(t)) ·W (γ(t)),
and since by definitionW (p) = (u−gm(p))V (p), we have ∇gm(p)·W (p) = (u−gm(p))∇gm(p)·
V (p), so
(4)
d
dt
(gm ◦ γ)(t) = (u− gm(γ(t)))∇gm(γ(t)) · V (γ(t)).
The right hand side is the product of two factors. The first is u − fm(γ(t)), which is
strictly negative by the previous assertion, and the second is ∇gm(γ(t)) · V (γ(t)) ≥ 0 which
is nonnegative by Assertion 2. Thus the derivative of t 7−→ (gm ◦ γ)(t) is nonpositive, and so
the map is nonincreasing. In particular, since at t = 0 we have (gm ◦ γ)(t) = gm(q) ≤ u2, this
same inequality holds for all t ≥ 0. 
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Assertion 5. For any p ∈ X[u1,u2] such that u < gm(p) ≤ u2 the inequality
(u− gm(p))∇f(p) · V (p) < 0
holds true.
Proof. Since u − gm(p) < 0, we only need to prove that ∇gm(p) · V (p) > 0. By Assertion 2,
this scalar product is always nonnegative and it is zero precisely when p is a critical point of
gm|X . Now, the choice of u1 and u2 guarantees that the critical points that gm|Y may have
in the set X[u1,u2] are all contained in Xu. Since p 6∈ Xu, the assertion follows. 
Assertion 6. gm(γ(t))→ u as t→ +∞.
Proof. Notice that t 7−→ (gm ◦ γ)(t) must indeed converge to some u∗ as t→ +∞ because ac-
cording to the computation in Assertion 4 it is a monotonous nonincreasing function bounded
below by u. Let us assume that u∗ is strictly larger than u and arrive at a contradiction.
Set D(p) = (u − gm(p))∇gm(p) · V (p) for brevity. Let Xu∗ = {p ∈ Y : gm(p) = u∗}. This
set is closed in Y , so it is compact. Also, the previous assertion says that D(p) < 0 for every
q ∈ Xu∗ . Since Xu∗ is compact and D is continuous, there is an ǫ < 0 such that D(p) < ǫ for
every p ∈ Xu∗ . In fact, more is true: there is a neighbourhood U of Xu∗ in X[u1,u2] where the
same inequality holds; that is, D(p) < ǫ for every p ∈ U .
We are almost finished. Since gm(γ(t)) → u∗ as t → +∞, there exists T > 0 such that
γ(t) ∈ U for every t > T . By the mean value theorem, for any t there exists ξt between t and
t + 1 such that
(5) gm(γ(t+ 1))− gm(γ(t)) =
d
dt
(gm ◦ γ)(ξt) = D(γ(ξt)),
where in the last equality we have used equation (4). Let us consider what happens in the
above expression when t→ +∞. Since ξt lies between t and t + 1, as soon as t > T we also
have ξt > T and therefore γ(ξt) ∈ U , which entails D(γ(ξt)) < ǫ. Thus the right hand side of
(5) is bounded away from 0 (recall that ǫ < 0). However, its left hand side converges to 0 as
t→ +∞ because both summands converge to u∗. This contradiction finishes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 15. (1) We have seen that for an initial condition q = γ(0) satisfying
u < gm(q) ≤ u2, the trajectory γ(t) remains in the set {p ∈ Y : u < gm(p) ≤ u2} for every
t ≥ 0. Evidently, if the initial condition q satisfies u1 ≤ gm(q) < u, similar arguments show
that γ(t) remains in the set {p ∈ Y : u1 ≤ gm(p) < u} for all t ≥ 0. The remaining case,
gm(q) = u, is very simple: q is then a zero of the vectorfield W and so γ(t) = q for every
t ∈ R. Summing up, for an initial condition q ∈ X[u1,u2] the trajectory γ remains in the set
SOLVING THE SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEM UNDER EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS 27
X[u1,u2]. Part (1) of the proposition is just a restatement of this, since in terms of the flow
the trajectory γ with initial condition q = γ(0) is simply γ(t) = ϕ(q, t).
(2) Find u′1 and u
′
2 such that u1 < u
′
1 < u < u
′
2 < u2 and X[u′1,u′2] ⊆ U . In accordance with
the notation we have been using so far, denote
X(u′
1
,u′
2
) = {p ∈ Y : u
′
1 < gm(p) < u
′
2},
which is an open subset of X[u1,u2] by continuity of gm. In fact it is a neighbourhood of Xu in
X[u1,u2], so by Assertion 6 for each q ∈ X[u1,u2] there exists tq ≥ 0 such that ϕ(q, tq) ∈ X(u′1,u′2).
Now the continuity of ϕ guarantees that q has an open neighbourhood Uq in X[u1,u2] such
that ϕ(Uq × {tq}) ⊆ X(u′
1
,u′
2
). In particular ϕ(Uq × {tq}) ⊆ X[u′
1
,u′
2
], and by part (1) of this
proposition (applied to X[u′
1
,u′
2
] rather than X[u1,u2]) we see that ϕ(Uq × {t}) ⊆ X[u′1,u′2] for
every t ≥ tq. The Uq cover the compact set X[u1,u2], so a finite family of them cover it too, say
Uq1, Uq2, . . . , Uqr . Let T be the maximum of tq1, tq2, . . . , tqr . Then whenever t ≥ T we have
that ϕ(q, t) ∈ X[u′
1
,u′
2
] for every t ∈ X[u1,u2], proving the proposition. 
We are finally ready to prove Lemma 9. For the convenience of the reader, we restate it
here:
Lemma. Given any neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1,u2] there exists a continuous mapping
r : X[u1,u2] −→ X[u1,u2] such that:
(1) r(p) ∈ U for every p ∈ X[u1,u2],
(2) r is homotopic to the identity in X[u1,u2].
Proof. According to Proposition 15 there exists T ≥ 0 such that ϕ(p, t) ∈ U for every p ∈
X[u1,u2] and every t ≥ T . Let r be defined by r(p) := ϕ(p, T ). By construction r(p) ∈ U ,
so indeed satisfies condition (1). Also, r is homotopic to the identity: the flow ϕ(p, t), for
0 ≤ t ≤ T , provides a suitable homotopy. Thus the lemma is proved. 
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered the (topological) social choice problem over bounded sets
of alternatives X ⊆ Rn that are defined by equality constraints gi(p) = ci. We have shown
that the problem has a solution in the affirmative if and only if the values ci of the constraints
that define the set X are finely tuned in the following sense: each of them must be either
the global maximum or the global minimum of the corresponding gi over the set defined by
the remaining constraints gj(p) = cj , j 6= i. When this condition is satisfied we say that X is
optimally designed. This criterion is simple to state and check explicitly and it is elementary
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in its language, which we feel is a valuable feature that distinguishes it from the results that
already exist in the literature.
It should be observed that the need for optimization emerges exclusively from the social
choice problem itself and not as a consequence of any particular interpretation of the variables,
the constraints, or any assumption concerning rationality, utility functions, or any other
element related to Economics. In the particular case when the set of alternatives X does
have an economical interpretation, the same is true of the principle of optimal design. This
was illustrated in the Introduction with a toy example where the condition of optimal design
meant that designer of the problem, if any, should behave rationally in the sense of Economics.
We emphasize again that the rationality of the agents involved in the actual choice plays
absolutely no role in this reasoning.
There exists an extensive literature on how to avoid social choice paradoxes, for instance
by constraining the way in which the agents choose their individual alternative ([1], [4], [20]),
by weakening the axioms that an aggregation rule needs to satisfy ([26]), or by requiring
that the agents provide richer information as their input for the aggregation rule ([11], [27]).
The interested reader can find many more references in [16]. We see that in our present
framework, requiring that the designer of the set of alternatives behaves in the way that is
almost axiomatic in Economics; that is, rationally, is a necessary and sufficient condition to
avoid a social choice paradox.
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